Where the euro area stands

2.50% ECB deposit rate, held unchanged on 29 October

3.8% Euro area inflation in September, against a 2% target

7 Feb Christine Lagarde steps down, eight months early

119% French public debt as a share of GDP, a post-war record

A hold, with December left open

The ECB left its three key rates unchanged on 29 October, keeping the deposit rate at 2.50%. The Governing Council was explicit that it is “not pre-committing to a particular rate path” and will continue with a data-dependent, meeting-by-meeting approach.

The language around inflation is what markets seized on. The statement pointed to continued rises in energy prices as an upside risk to inflation and a downside risk to growth, and noted that the energy shock is proving both larger and longer-lasting than expected. With inflation running at 3.8% in September — close to double the target — a large majority of economists polled by Reuters now expect a further quarter-point increase in December, a marked reversal from a month earlier. Most expect the deposit rate to peak at 2.75%, though a sizeable minority look for 3.00%.

For anyone holding or paying euros, the practical point is this: the market has moved from expecting the ECB to be finished to expecting one more move, and that repricing happened quickly. Interest rate expectations are the single biggest driver of currency direction, and they are no longer settled.

A change at the top of the ECB

On the same day as the rate decision, Christine Lagarde announced she will leave the ECB on 7 February 2027, eight months before her term was due to end. Former central bank governors Klaas Knot of the Netherlands and Pablo Hernández de Cos of Spain are widely seen as the frontrunners to replace her, and the appointment comes alongside other senior departures from the Executive Board.

Markets took it calmly, on the reasoning that the ECB’s institutional behaviour outlasts any one president. That is a fair assessment for now. It is worth watching nonetheless, because leadership transitions at a central bank tend to matter most precisely when a difficult decision has to be taken — and with inflation near double target and growth under pressure from energy costs, the incoming president may inherit exactly that.

Germany: a government under strain

Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s coalition has had a difficult autumn. A heavy defeat in the Saxony-Anhalt state election in September was followed by further losses in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and national polling has the AfD ahead of the governing Union parties. Commentators have discussed a confidence vote, a change of chancellor within the Union, or a coalition collapse. None has been scheduled, the next federal election is not due until 2029, and Mr Merz has said he intends to stay.

For currency markets, German political instability has so far mattered less than the headlines suggest. Germany’s public finances remain comparatively strong, so a weak government in Berlin does not immediately translate into higher borrowing costs. What it does affect is the euro area’s capacity to agree a collective fiscal response if conditions deteriorate — a slower-burning risk than a market event, but a real one.

France is the bigger market problem

France is where the euro’s political risk is currently concentrated. Public debt stands at around 119% of GDP, the highest since shortly after the Second World War, and Moody’s expects it to reach 122% next year. The agency held its rating at Aa3 with a negative outlook in October — Fitch and S&P already rate France a notch lower — while warning that political fragmentation could impair the functioning of the country’s legislative institutions.

The 2027 budget, which would cut the deficit to 5% of GDP from 5.4%, has not passed. Moody’s expects it to be adopted eventually, possibly by decree, and to deliver a smaller reduction than intended. Parliament is divided, protests over the cost of living have run for more than a month, and French government bond yields have reached their highest in 24 years. A presidential election follows in the spring, with polling currently favouring candidates from outside the political centre and investors questioning whether any likely winner would deliver the fiscal consolidation the numbers require.

This matters for the euro in a way German coalition arithmetic does not. When French borrowing costs rise relative to German ones, it raises the question of fragmentation within the single currency — and that question, rather than any individual election result, is what tends to put the euro under sustained pressure.

What this means if you have euro exposure

For businesses. If you buy from European suppliers, sell into the euro area, or hold euro-denominated costs, you are exposed to two moving parts at once: an interest rate decision in December that is no longer a foregone conclusion, and a French fiscal story with no clear resolution date. Either can move the euro. Together they widen the range of outcomes over the next quarter rather than pointing in one direction.

For private clients. Property purchases in France, Spain, Italy or Portugal, relocation costs, pension income drawn in euros and regular family transfers all share a characteristic: the timing is usually fixed by someone else. A completion date or a school term does not move because a budget vote has been delayed.

The useful question in both cases is not where the euro is heading. It is how much a move against you would cost on the payments you already know are coming, and whether that is a number you are comfortable leaving to the market.

What to watch over the next quarter

  • The December ECB meeting. A hike is now the consensus expectation rather than an outside chance, which means a hold would itself be a surprise.
  • French bond yields and the spread over Germany. The clearest real-time measure of how seriously markets are taking the French fiscal position.
  • Energy prices. The ECB has named these directly as the reason inflation is proving stickier than expected, so they now feed straight into rate expectations.
  • The ECB succession. Unlikely to move the euro by itself, but relevant if the Governing Council faces a genuinely contested decision during the handover.

None of this points reliably in one direction, and anyone claiming otherwise is guessing. What it does mean is that the range of plausible outcomes for the euro over the next few months is wider than it has been for some time. For businesses and individuals with euro payments already in the diary, that is an argument for deciding in advance what you are prepared to accept — through a forward contract to fix a rate for a future payment, a limit order to target a level, or simply a rate alert so nothing happens unnoticed.